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CROWDFUNDING WITHOUT THE CROWD*
DARIAN M. IBRAHIM**
The final crowdfunding rules took three years for the Securites and
Exchange Commission to pass, but crowdfunding—the offering of
securities over the Internet—is now a reality. But now that
crowdfunding is legal, will it be successful? Will crowdfunding be a
regular means by which new companies raise money, or will it be
relegated to a wasteland of the worst startups and foolish investors?
This Article argues that crowdfunding has a greater chance of
success if regulators abandon the idea that the practice does (and
should) employ “crowd-based wisdom.” Instead, I argue that
crowdfunding needs intermediation by experts that mirrors the
successful forms of entrepreneurial finance (e.g., angel investing
and venture capital) that have preceded it.
The final Securities and Exchange Commission rules move us in
the right direction. At the heart of the crowdfunding experience lies
the “funding portal,” or the website that will actually list the startup
as an investment opportunity. Funding portals were originally
conceived of as almost completely passive entities who could not
subjectively “curate” (or screen) the startups that wished to list on
the sites. The final Securities and Exchange Commission rules
permit some funding portal curation, which will allow funding
portals to list, on the whole, companies with a better chance of
success for investors to choose from.
This Article argues, however, this permitted curation does not go
far enough, given a funding portal’s justified concern over
becoming a broker-dealer. Thus, I suggest ways in which expert
investors participating in crowdfunding offerings can and should
use a site’s message boards and investment clubs to further guide
unsophisticated investors toward better investment choices. At the
same time, I acknowledge potential liability concerns for experts
who do so. Together, on balance, careful curation by funding
* © 2017 Darian M. Ibrahim.
** Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. My thanks to participants in the
North Carolina Law Review Symposium on “The Role of Law in Promoting
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Plowman and Emily Wagman.
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portals and nudging from expert investors will give crowdfunding a
better chance of facilitating market successes while improving
investor transparency by offering heightened guidance from
industry experts.
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INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is now a reality. In October 2015, after a several-year
wait, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
promulgated final rules to implement Title III of the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act (“Regulation Crowdfunding”).1
“Startup” companies can now use the Internet to offer securities to any
investor with Internet access.2

1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306,
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. A definitional problem tends to arise when writing about entrepreneurship. Gordon
Smith and I situate opportunities at the heart of entrepreneurship and define entrepreneurial
opportunities as “the subset of market opportunities that involve some form of novelty or
innovation.” D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1540 (2013) (citing SCOTT SHANE, FOOL’S GOLD? THE TRUTH
BEHIND ANGEL INVESTING IN AMERICA 39–41 (2009)). That means I am usually writing
about companies with some sort of high-tech innovation; but as noted later, most of the initial
crowdfunding offerings are lifestyle or alcoholic beverage companies. See infra note 117. This
is still a novelty, just one in the “weak sense” rather than the “strong sense.” See Darian M.
Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of
Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 84–85 (2008) (citing Smith & Ibrahim, supra).
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I have previously written about crowdfunding.3 My prior article
took a comprehensive look at crowdfunding’s evolution and its place in
the entrepreneurial finance landscape.4 I concluded that while
crowdfunding could well turn into a “market for lemons[,]” in which bad
startups seek dumb money as a last resort, possibilities for avoiding this
outcome existed.5 I argued that some promising startups—especially
very early-stage startups—would have good reasons to crowdfund,6 and
that the key was to create an environment where investors could
distinguish those promising startups from the many duds that will also
populate crowdfunding sites.7 In particular, I argued that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should make certain changes to the
concept and operation of “funding portals,” the new intermediary
between startups and investors in the crowdfunding space,8 before
adopting its final rules.9 Funding portals are the websites that list the
startups available for crowdfunding investments,10 and I argued they

3. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100
MINN. L. REV. 561 (2015) (examining the development of crowdfunding as well as its
potential advantages, disadvantages, and areas for improvement).
4. Id. I argued that, in addition to preexisting networks, close geographic proximity
between startups and professional investors (angels and venture capitalists) are elements that
have contributed to traditional entrepreneurial finance success. Id. at 564. The Internet, by its
very nature, eliminates these things.
5. Id. at 591–606.
6. See id. at 589–90 (“[T]here are two types of high-quality startups that might elect to
use Title III to raise funds. First, Title III should appeal to high-quality startups that are too
young for ‘professional’ financing under Title II or traditional methods. . . . Second, even for
high-quality startups that have progressed a bit further, Title III would appeal to that subset
of startups that need cash but do not need value-added services from investors.” (citations
omitted)).
7. Id. at 592–603 (discussing disclosure, crowd wisdom, and reputational intermediaries
as three possible ways of reducing information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and
investors).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2015); Joan Macleod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the
Block: Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 178–79
(2013) (taking an early look at funding portals as a “new, statutorily ordained and mandated
intermediary in certain securities offerings made through the Internet”). See Stacy Cowley,
New Crowdfunding Rules Let the Small Fry Swim with Sharks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May
14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/business/dealbook/new-crowdfunding-rules-letthe-small-fry-swim-with-sharks.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3E5J-75SJ] (describing funding
portals as “a kind of online bazaar for investment deals”).
9. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 602–06 (arguing that funding portals should more closely
resemble the “Nomads” that make London’s Alternative Investment Market successful).
10. Stuart Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012) (describing a funding portal as an “Internet site
that lists crowdfunding opportunities and provides a matching service for interested
investors”).
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should play a larger role as reputational intermediaries between startups
and investors.11
In this Article, I further probe the question at the heart of the
funding portal’s role: Does crowdfunding need expert intermediation to
succeed? Or is crowdfunding, as the name implies, a true “wisdom of the
crowds” situation in which expert screening is unnecessary, and perhaps
antithetical, to achieving an outcome where crowdfunding is a financial
success for more companies and more investors? The answer to this
question will go a long way toward determining Regulation
Crowdfunding’s success or failure, and indeed, goes to crowdfunding’s
fundamental nature as an investment option.
Ultimately, this Article argues that, like all securities offerings,
crowdfunding does require expert intermediation to succeed. The
Article then argues that the most logical expert intermediary is the
funding portal itself.12 Thankfully the SEC’s final crowdfunding rules
allow funding portals to do some screening among the startups that wish
to list on its site, using the funding portal’s judgment as to which startups
are most likely to be successful.13 However, funding portals can only do
so much subjective curation without crossing the line into becoming a
broker-dealer.14 Thus, for crowdfunding to succeed, expert investors
11. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 602–06.
12. See David M. Freedman & Matthew R. Nutting, 7-Step Crowdfunding Investment
Plan: Step 4: Select the Right Funding Portals, CROWDFINANCEHUB (Mar. 30, 2016), http://
www.financialpoise.com/crowdfundinginvestor/seven-steps/step-4-select-the-right-fundingportals/ [https://perma.cc/2XZ8-NP2V] (“Intermediaries known as funding portals and
broker-dealer platforms lie at the heart of the equity crowdfunding experience.”).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 80, 86.
14. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(c)(2)(i) (2016); id. § 227.402(a). A funding portal can
choose to register as a broker-dealer. See id. § 227.300(a) (defining intermediaries that may
sell under Regulation Crowdfunding as registered brokers, funding portals, and registered
national securities association members). The benefits to broker-dealer status are that brokerdealers can offer investment advice to potential investors, compensate employees based on
securities sales, and hold/handle funds or securities, while non-broker-dealers cannot. See id.
§ 227.300(c)(2) (defining “[f]unding portal” as “a broker acting as an intermediary in a
transaction involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on [Regulation Crowdfunding]
that does not: (i) Offer investment advice or recommendations; (ii) Solicit purchases, sales or
offers to buy the securities displayed on its platform; (iii) Compensate employees, agents, or
other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed or referenced on
its platform; or (iv) Hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities”);
id. § 227.402(a) (prohibiting unregistered broker-dealers from participating in these activities);
David M. Freedman & Matthew R. Nutting, Distinguishing Crowdfunding Portals and
Broker-Dealer Platforms Under Title III, FIN. POISE (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.financialpoise
.com/columns/crowdfunding-for-investors/distinguishing-crowdfunding-portals-and-brokerdealer-platforms-under-title-iii/ [https://perma.cc/AN22-JQF8] (“Broker-dealer platforms are
authorized to do, while funding portals (which are not owned or operated by broker-dealers)
are prohibited from doing, the following: Offer investment advice or recommendations to
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participating in crowdfunding offerings should be active on a site’s
message boards and investment clubs to guide unsophisticated investors
toward the best startups—albeit carefully to avoid unwanted liability
exposure.15
This Article begins with a brief history of the crowdfunding rules,
both as originally proposed in the JOBS Act of 2012 and as finally
promulgated by the SEC in October 2015. Second, the Article looks at
the difference between expert-based and crowd-based approaches to
investing as a general matter. The Article concludes that for startup
investing, experts are necessary to achieve better financial outcomes for
companies and investors. Third, the Article outlines precisely how
expert opinions can and should work in the crowdfunding context. It
argues that the SEC’s changes to the funding portal concept, by allowing
some curation, are a move in the right direction, while also
acknowledging that further intermediation to guide unsophisticated
investors is likely necessary for investor transparency. Finally, the
Article suggests ways in which expert investors participating in
crowdfunding offerings can also curate among startups for
unsophisticated investors. In sum, funding portal and expert investor
curation further pushes crowdfunding away from its moniker’s bottomup, crowd-based approach toward a more appropriate top-down, expertbased system.
Throughout, this Article observes that crowdfunding’s move toward
an expert-based system means it should no longer be viewed as a
revolutionary idea in entrepreneurial finance. Instead, the Article
reveals that crowdfunding as implemented will more closely resemble
angel and venture capital (“VC”) investing models rather than
something revolutionary.16 In my opinion, this is a happy accident. As an
expert-driven system, crowdfunding has a better chance for success than
if the “crowd” leads the discussion as to which startups are the most
viable. In short, “crowdfunding without the crowd” just might work.

investors.”). However, broker-dealers are subject to strict due diligence standards, see 31
C.F.R. §§ 1023.100–.670 (2012), federal securities law’s antifraud provisions, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q (2012), and becoming a broker-dealer is a costly step that is unlikely to be attractive to
many, if not most, funding portals, see JOBS ACT CREATES TWO NEW EXEMPTIONS FROM
BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 1–3 (2012), http://www
.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2012/04/JOBS-Act-Creates-Two-NewExemptions-from-BrokerD__/Files/View-full-memo-JOBS-Act-Creates-Two-New-Exemptio__
/FileAttachment/JOBSActCreatesTwoNewExemptionsfromBrokerDealerRe__.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X839-VDDH].
15. See infra Section III.B.3.
16. See infra Section III.B.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF CROWDFUNDING
Scholars have long-cited a funding gap between investors and
startups.17 The claim is that promising startups exist, but due to the lack
of geographic proximity to investors, they do not receive the funding
they would absent these market failures.18 Crowdfunding was designed
to close the funding gap by harnessing the Internet’s power to reduce
transaction costs in matching startups and investors.19 Crowdfunding was
also designed to democratize startup investing, so that “ordinary
Americans” could have a chance to own the next Facebook or Twitter
before they are public (and commanding a much higher stock price).20
Legislators viewed crowdfunding as a “job creation mechanism[]” and
the legislation easily passed Congress with bipartisan support.21
Crowdfunding was thus viewed as a win-win-win for everyone.

17. See, e.g., John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 874 (2005) (“[A] substantial funding gap has been documented for rapidgrowth start-ups in the $250,000 to $5 million range.” (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL
FORMATION 12–13 (2000); Jeffery E. Sohl, The US Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent
Trends and Developments, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2003, at 14–15); id. at 881–83 (stating
that startups and angels have trouble finding each other due to high transaction costs,
including legal barriers); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow
General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004)
(“Estimates indicate . . . that financial markets fall short by some $60 billion annually in
meeting the demand of small companies for early-stage private equity financing. This unmet
need is referred to as the funding gap.” (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GGD-00190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 2 (2000);
Jeffery E. Sohl, The Early-Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE CAP.: INT’L
ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 101, 110 (1999)).
18. See Orcutt, supra note 17, at 879–83. For example, a VC’s business model of heavy
due diligence and active monitoring does not support an investment of less than $5 million, far
too much cash for a nascent startup; see Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 733–34 (2010) (discussing why VCs eschew early-stage startups as a
general matter).
19. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931 (2011)
(“Crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs to more quickly and easily identify supporterinvestors who are willing and able to fund their businesses or projects.”); see also Ibrahim,
supra note 3, at 585–86 (noting that Title II of the JOBS Act, which permits online fundraising
from accredited investors only, likewise reduces transaction costs for angels looking to add
passive investors to their deals).
20. See Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
2013, at C1 (quoting President Obama as calling crowdfunding a “game changer” that allows
“ordinary Americans . . . to go online and invest in entrepreneurs they believe in”).
21. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339 (2013) (stating that
crowdfunding and other provisions of the JOBS Act “were all styled as job creation
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Crowdfunding derives its origin from crowdsourcing, the same idea
behind websites like Yelp and Wikipedia.22 Through crowdsourcing, the
collective wisdom of the people tells others what the best restaurants are
in a town, or produces an accurate biography of a notable person, for
example.23 Crowdfunding applies that idea to financially backing a
project or a company, whether it is the Veronica Mars movie24 or a new
whiskey.25 Thus, crowdfunding allows more people to own a private
startup that might ultimately become the next Facebook. It also,
theoretically, allows them to drive the choice of which startup will
become the next Facebook through the crowd’s collective wisdom.
Prior to the JOBS Act of 2012, the Internet could not be used to
match startups and investors due to SEC Rule 506’s ban on “general
solicitation.”26 However, Title II of the JOBS Act removed this ban for
accredited investors in 2012, the same wealthy club of individuals who
previously financed startups offline.27 Thus, Title II started closing the
purported funding gap by taking the geography out of startup investing.
To truly democratize startup investing, however, Title III
(Regulation Crowdfunding) was needed to open up Internet investing to

mechanisms—a particularly potent political label heading into an election year—and
bipartisan momentum grew”).
22. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457,
1459 (2013).
23. Id.
24. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 568 (discussing this “[n]on-equity crowdfunding” (citing
Chance Barnett, Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014 [https://perma.cc/R6PJ
-JUY4]).
25. Cleveland Whiskey: Whiskey 2.0/Disruptive Technology, WEFUNDER, https://
wefunder.com/cleveland.whiskey [http://perma.cc/EXH2-JN2S].
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2011) (amended 2012); Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 570 (quoting
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014)) (explaining the general solicitation ban and its hindrance of
Internet offerings).
27. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306,
313 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2016) (defining “accredited
investor” as: (1) certain bank or development entities or (2) “any person who, on the basis of
such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial
matters, or amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited investor under
rules and regulations which the [SEC] shall prescribe”). But see Robert B. Thompson &
Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital
Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1616 (2013) (“Accredited-investor status is no longer for
the very well off by virtue of inflation over time and now encompasses a broad swath of retail
investors in the United States . . . .” (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF
THE SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 77 (2006)).
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even unaccredited investors, or the “non-one percenters.”28 Although it
took several years for the SEC to implement the final rules, Regulation
Crowdfunding recently became a reality.29 The three-year delay between
passing the JOBS Act and the final Regulation Crowdfunding rules was
due to concerns over fraud and other investor protection worries in this
new medium.30 The SEC always attempts to balance a business’s ability
to raise capital with protecting the investors who will supply that
capital.31 The JOBS Act, and in particular Regulation Crowdfunding,
favors economic growth and job creation over investor protection.32
Investor protection in Regulation Crowdfunding comes primarily
from limiting the amount any one investor can lose. As I observed in my
previous article, “Title III [Regulation Crowdfunding] attempts to limit
the downside for unaccredited investors in a novel way—by specifying

28. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 572 (“Title III of the JOBS Act would make it possible, for
the first time, for unaccredited investors to purchase equity in nascent startups through the
Internet.”).
29. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306,
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Albeit with limitations for
unaccredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a) (2016) (creating monetary caps for
unaccredited investors purchasing crowdfunded securities).
30. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1753–54 (2012) (arguing for greater disclosure in
crowdfunding offerings); Cowley, supra note 8 (“Concerned about protecting investors from
charlatans, bad ideas and their own poor judgment, the [SEC] spent years drafting its
proposed rules. The final version, released in October [2015], runs to 685 pages.” (citing Stacy
Cowley, S.E.C. Gives Small Investors Access to Equity Crowdfunding, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/business/dealbook/secgives-small-investors-access-to-equity-crowdfunding.html [https://perma.cc/Y4WB-GY5Q];
Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9947; 34-76324 (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec
.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU4E-SNB4]); see also Thompson &
Langevoort, supra note 27, at 1617 (“[A]s distributions of securities move from bargaining
with a small group of buyers to mass marketing directed at a large, dispersed group of well-off
retail investors, the likelihood of successful opportunism grows.”).
31. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://investor
.gov/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/73Z3-G7CW] (“The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a three-part mission: [1] Protect investors, [2] Maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets [3] Facilitate capital formation[.]”). C. Steven Bradford,
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 117 (2012)
(observing that “investor protection and capital formation are, to some extent, incompatible
goals”).
32. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 27, at 1573 (“Congress enacted the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in 2012 amidst a perceived crisis in entrepreneurial capital
raising.” (citing Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)); see also id. at 1574 (stating that Congress
“demonstrat[ed] a political willingness to trade off some level of investor protection in order
to promote capital formation and its hoped-for payoff, job creation”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2017)

2017]

CROWDFUNDING

1489

how much they can purchase in Title III startups in any given year.”33
The final rules limit investment by unaccredited investors to $2,000, or
5% of annual income or net worth, for investors making less than
$100,000 annually, or up to 10% of annual income or net worth for
investors making over $100,000 annually.34 Funding portals are tasked
with ensuring investors comply with these limits.35 Other than that, and
some background checks on the issuer’s principals,36 funding portals
were originally to play a passive role in the crowdfunding process.37 They
were not designed to guide investors toward the best startups—that was
left up to the “crowd.”
II. INVESTING GENERALLY: CROWDS VERSUS EXPERTS
When it comes to investing, who is better equipped to choose
winners: crowds or experts? Proponents of the crowd observe that
actively managed investment funds usually do not outperform the
market average.38 Sections A and B below respectively compare and
contrast core principles of crowd-based versus expert-based approaches
and how they apply to investing, particularly to startup investing.

33. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 572.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
35. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
36. Id. § 77d-1(a)(5).
37. Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304, 126 Stat. 306, 321–
22 (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.). Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 602–03; see DAVID M.
FREEDMAN & MATTHEW R. NUTTING, EQUITY CROWDFUNDING FOR INVESTORS: A
GUIDE TO RISKS, RETURNS, REGULATIONS, FUNDING PORTALS, DUE DILIGENCE, AND
DEAL TERMS 120–21 (2015) (suggesting that before the final SEC Regulation Crowdfunding
rules, it was unclear that funding portals could use subjective criteria to screen startups).
38. See Alan M. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising:
Inherently and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 302 (2012) (discussing a mutual
fund study finding “that only 0.6% of [mutual] funds actually exhibited skill in their long-term
performance[, a statistically insignificant result] . . . . meaning that there was not strong
evidence that any fund managers are skillful enough to outperform their benchmarks in the
long run” and noting that “[a] recent study by Professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French
reached a similar conclusion” (first citing Laurent Barras, Oliver Scaillet & Russ Wermers,
False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J.
FIN. 179, 181 (2010), then citing Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in
the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915, 1915 (2010)); Burton G. Malkiel,
Searching for Rational Investors: Explaining the Lowenstein Paradox, 30 J. CORP. L. 567, 571
& Exhibit 2 (2005) (presenting evidence that “two-thirds or more of professionally managed
large capitalization equity mutual funds are outperformed by the S&P 500 stock index after
expenses”).
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A. Crowds
At the heart of this Article is the claim that when it comes to
startup investing, crowds are not as good as experts at screening among
the many potential startups seeking funding. Much has been written on
crowds versus experts, or bottom-up versus top-down approaches, as a
general matter.39 James Surowiecki’s popular book The Wisdom of
Crowds recites colorful examples of when crowd-based wisdom has
produced better results than expert-based wisdom.40
A particularly remarkable illustration of crowd-based wisdom,
recounted in The Wisdom of Crowds, was when a team of salvage men,
mathematicians, and others tried to determine the location of a lost U.S.
submarine in 1968.41 The naval officer leading the search had each
participant submit his or her best guess of where the submarine was
located, based on very limited information and without consulting
others.42 No participant alone came up with the submarine’s exact
location. But when the participants’ guesses were aggregated, they
pinpointed the submarine’s location to within 220 yards—remarkably
close given the wide search parameters.43 This example illustrates
Surowiecki’s central claim that “chasing the expert is a mistake,” and
instead “ask the crowd . . . [because c]hances are, it knows.”44

39. Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 505
(2014) (observing the notion “as old as the Republic—that the common people as a whole
possess a deeper wisdom than the educated elites” (citing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM
OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE
WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS, at xiii–xiv (2004)); John
Ferejohn, The Lure of Large Numbers: A Constitution of Many Minds, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1969, 1980 (2010) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009);
ADRIAN VERMUELE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009)) (quoting Aristotle and
noting that “[i]n some ways the idea that ordinary people can make wise choices is very old”).
40. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES,
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS, at xii–xiii, xx–xxi, 3–5, 7–8 (2004).
41. Id. at xx (citing SHERRY SONTAG & CHRISTOPHER DREW, BLIND MAN’S BLUFF
146–50 (1998)).
42. See id. (“[T]he area where the navy began searching for the [submarine] was a circle
twenty miles wide and many thousands of feet deep. You could not imagine a more hopeless
task.”).
43. Id. at xxi (“The final estimate was a genuinely collective judgment . . . [i]t was also a
genuinely brilliant judgment.”).
44. Id. at xv (citing Richard P. Larrick & Jack B. Soll, Intuitions About Combining
Opinions: Misappreciation of the Averaging Principle, 52 MGMT. SCI. 111, 125 (2006)). In
another famous example, 800 county fair participants guessed an ox’s weight. Id. at xii (citing
FRANCIS GALTON, MEMORIES OF MY LIFE 280–81 (1908); Francis Galton, The Ballot-Box,
75 NATURE 509, 509 (1907); Francis Galton, Vox Populi, 75 NATURE 450, 450–51 (1907)).
When all votes were averaged, their collective guess was within one pound of the ox’s actual
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For the crowd-based problem-solving approach to work, however,
Surowiecki cautions that five factors are necessary: (1) diversity of
opinion; (2) independence; (3) decentralization among participants; (4) a
method for aggregating participants’ individual solutions; and (5) the
existence of a well-defined problem having a definitive solution.45 These
factors were present in the lost-submarine example. The question
becomes, are these factors also present when it comes to investing, and
in particular when using crowdfunding to invest?
Some leading commentators are optimistic about using the wisdom
of crowds in Title III investing. For example, Professor Andrew
Schwartz argues that “[c]rowdfunding is well positioned to capitalize on
the wisdom of crowds[,]” and that instead of “chaos and anarchy . . . the
‘wisdom of the crowd’ theory suggests that [equity crowdfunders] will do
a relatively good job at picking winners.”46 Professor Joan Heminway
suggests that “preliminar[y] indicat[ions are] that the crowd of
crowdfund investors has the potential for wisdom[,]” but cautions that
“[s]ignificant empirical research is needed” to determine this.47 I too
suggested in my previous article that crowd-based wisdom could reduce
information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and unsophisticated
Title III investors—I was writing about “knowledgeable segment[s] of
the crowd” serving as signals to unsophisticated investors, which are in
fact expert opinions.48

weight. Id. at xiii. The Iowa prediction markets likewise rely on crowd-based wisdom to
predict the results of presidential elections. Id. at 17–19 (citing Robert Forsythe et al.,
Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1142, 1142–61
(1992); Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Market Research
(Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/trietz/papers
/iemresults.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF7L-NRJ5]; Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast
Standard Error of Prediction Markets (July 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://tippie.biz
.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf [https://perma.cc/R23Z-NCDN]).
45. Id. at 21–22 (describing “diversity, independence, and decentralization” in decision
markets); id. at 236 (“With football games, elections, Millionaire questions, and Google
searches, there is a definitive answer, which at some point is settled once and for all.”); id. at
237 (“The problem with the stock market is that there never is a point at which you can say
that it’s over, never a point at which you will definitively be proved right or wrong.”).
46. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 661 (2015)
(citing Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 27, at 1605).
47. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 845 (2014).
48. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 598 (citing Keongtae Kim & Siva Viswanathan, The Experts in
the Crowd: The Role of Reputable Investors in a Crowdfunding Market 3 (Nov. 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aa82/f39d6736a59c0e36847
0603779a6aec1c828.pdf?_ga=1.13005047.1170105659.1493596887 [https://perma.cc/UUU4
-ULF9]). For a discussion of this expanded definition of an “expert,” see infra note 117.
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However, not all commentators are comfortable with deploying
crowd-based approaches in the investment context. In the context of
stock markets generally, Surowiecki himself—obviously a crowd-overexperts proponent—identifies significant problems in applying crowdbased wisdom to investing.49 First, Surowiecki argues that although stock
markets seem diverse due to their large volume and many participants,
the relative lack of short sellers negates diversity because all buyers are
betting on a stock’s price to rise.50 Further, beyond the elements
suggested by Surowiecki, herd behavior is a well-documented investor
behavioral bias that undercuts the independence criterion.51 The
independence criterion is also undercut by the realization that investors
buy stocks not simply based on what they think of them, but whether
they think others will also find them attractive when they decide to
resell.52 A third problem with applying crowd-based wisdom to investing
is that there is never a definitive “answer” to a stock’s inherent value;
unless the company goes bankrupt, the stock price continues to fluctuate
in perpetuity. A final problem, it seems, is that crowd-based wisdom
does not apply well to weighted averages because stock prices are not
dictated by a representative segment of investors but are instead skewed
by the most active or wealthy investors.53
Applying the criteria for crowd-based wisdom to investing generally
reveals a bad fit. Applying these criteria to startup and crowdfunding
investing, specifically, reveals an even worse fit. First, the investor pool
49. SUROWIECKI, supra note 40, at 228, 237.
50. Id. at 228. Of course, having as many sellers as buyers in the stock market generally
could be seen as the requisite diversity of opinion.
51. See, e.g., David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 470–75 (1990) (presenting a model of herd equilibria and its decisionmaking implications on managers and investors); see also SUROWIECKI, supra note 40, at 229
(“[I]nvestors sometimes herd, preferring the safety of the company of others to mak[ing]
independent decisions.”).
52. Ken Eisold, Investors Following the Crowd, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hidden-motives/201412/investors-following-the-crowd
[https://perma.cc/JMJ4-L8A9] (arguing that “[t]he wisdom of crowds doesn’t apply to picking
stocks” and that “the pressure to fit into the crowd and conform takes over and will lead
[crowd investors] astray”).
53. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS:
REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 618 (2010) (stating that the wisdom of
the crowd is limited by “two important qualifications,” one of which is “that all beliefs are
equally weighted”); see id. at 641 (noting that market performance in markets using weighted
averages “is not based on the benefits of averaging, as in . . . the ‘wisdom of crowds.’
Rather . . . the crowd is exactly as smart as its smartest participant . . . [T]his idea draws on a
long history of economic markets for market efficiency based on natural selection, in which
smart traders come to hold an increasingly large fraction of wealth in the market and thereby
exert an increasingly large influence on the market” (citations omitted)).
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in any given crowdfunding offering is likely to be very small relative to a
publicly traded stock, thus negating the diversity criterion. Further, all
investors in a crowdfunding offering are betting for the startup—no one
is betting against it.54 Herd behavior (and thus dependence) is likely in
crowdfunding, as investors will want to choose “winners” to fund.55 Also,
most crowdfunding offerings operate on an all-or-nothing basis, meaning
that a startup must raise all of the funds it seeks or it gets no funds at all,
thus exacerbating the herd mentality.56 Conversely, however, the all-ornothing approach provides a somewhat more definitive solution than is
present in public markets: either the crowdfunding offering is successful
or it is not. But of course, raising the desired Title III funds in no way
ensures the startup’s eventual success or an investor’s liquidity.57
Overall, the criteria necessary for crowd-based wisdom to function
efficiently do not appear to be remotely met in startup investing.
B.

Experts

While crowd-based wisdom does not seem to be a good fit with
startup investing, expert-based investing has a proven track record in
similar areas. As a preliminary observation, experts are known to play
an important role in investing generally. For instance, reputational
intermediaries serve important signaling and bonding roles in public
company investing.58 Initial public offering (“IPO”) issuers hire well54. Without resale markets there are no sellers, and certainly no traditional short sellers.
See Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (May 13, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide051316.htm [https://perma.cc/DQ8V-W7W6]; see also infra note 106. But see Steve LeVine,
Investors Have Placed a One-Way Bet on Uber—Which Made Us Want to Find a Way to Short
It, QUARTZ (Aug. 5, 2016), http://qz.com/707947 [https://perma.cc/8MN6-32MK] (explaining
why investors may want to short Uber, but noting that because Uber is currently not publicly
traded, shorting the stock is difficult, and can currently occur only through indirect means, or
possibly by purchasing derivative forward contracts or using credit default swaps).
55. See Eisold, supra note 52.
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.304(d) (2016) (requiring intermediaries to return investor funds if
an offering is not completed); see also id. § 227.201(g) (requiring intermediaries to inform
investors that if “[t]he target offering amount and the deadline to reach the target offering
amount . . . does not equal or exceed the target offering amount at the offering deadline, no
securities will be sold in the offering, investment commitments will be cancelled and
committed funds will be returned[.]”).
57. Crowdfunded securities are subject to resale restrictions for one year. Id. § 227.501(a).
Also, it remains to be seen what secondary markets might develop for crowdfunding
securities.
58. Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
1, 14 (1998) (observing the “function that financial intermediaries play in signaling and
bonding the informational credibility of issuer disclosure”).
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known investment banks to rent their reputations to the offering, thus
enticing investors who might otherwise be wary of funding the company
due to its limited track record.59 Often times, “[t]he participation of
reputational intermediaries in a transaction . . . acts as a signaling device
to the market, enhancing trust in the transaction.”60
As applied to startup investing specifically, there is a proven track
record of success due to expert investors populating a similar space.
Angel and VC investors have long succeeded because those investors
are repeat players and experts in this particular niche.61 For example,
angel investors are usually ex-entrepreneurs who successfully sold a
startup in the same technical field in which they now invest.62 These
investors are also experts in understanding what makes a successful
entrepreneur and how to grow and scale a startup.63
59. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (“[I]ntermediaries can credibly vouch for the
quality of particular securities because they are repeat players who will suffer a reputational
loss, if they let a company falsify or unduly exaggerate its prospects, that exceeds their onetime gain from permitting the exaggeration.”); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1086
(2003) (presenting the idea that reputation markets are extralegal mechanisms that constrain
parties’ behavior and exist in the corporate community when there are (1) repeat players in a
close knit community, (2) “shared expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior,”
and (3) an ability to police whether behavior conforms to those expectations).
60. Heminway, supra note 8, at 186.
61. See Bijan Khosravi, A Deeper Look at the Venture Capital Landscape in 2016,
FORBES (Apr. 1, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bijankhosravi/2016/04/01/adeeper-look-at-forbes-the-midas-list-2016/#2c3635c31fba [https://perma.cc/TX45-MUKF]
(“Sometimes tried and true is the way to go, especially when it comes to finding a solid,
reliable investor. There are a number of VCs who have repeatedly appeared on the Midas
List over the past five years . . . .”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of
Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1424 (2008) (“[E]ven if angels invest in a number of
start-ups, their preference [is] for start-ups in their field of expertise[.]”).
62. See Ibrahim, supra note 61, at 1427 (“[A]ngels are overwhelmingly ex-entrepreneurs,
which suggests that they not only understand investing as a general matter, but start-up
investments in particular. Many angels made their fortunes after going through the very same
funding process on the other side, when running their own start-ups.” (citing John Freear et
al., Angels and Non-Angels: Are There Differences?, 9 J. BUS. VENTURING 109, 111 (1994);
MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: MATCHING
START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES—THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS,
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 108 (2000)).
63. See Vivek Wadhwa, Venture Capital: The Good, Bad, and Ugly, BLOOMBERG (July
17, 2006, 5:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-07-17/venture-capital-thegood-bad-and-uglybusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [https://
perma.cc/R723-KQBT] (“Venture capitalist firms are usually staffed by experienced
executives who have not only been successful on their own, but have also watched dozens of
startups succeed and fail. They can guide you through your journey.”). According to Silicon
Valley guru Paul Graham, in terms of selecting investments, someone who “knows what a
successful startup founder looks like is actually far ahead of someone who knows terms
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Angel investors almost always invest in syndicates, in which passive
angels rely on an “expert” active angel to take the lead on ex ante
screening and due diligence and to actively engage, ex post, with the
startup.64 In Title II crowdfunding (accredited investors only), I have
noted that early successes are due to angel investors’ ability to move this
same business model online and add even more non-expert, passive
angels at low transaction costs.65 I have also noted that having an expert
angel lead a funding round also provides a positive signal to the VCs
who might follow, just as a strong venture capital round provides a signal
to investment bankers who might underwrite the startup’s IPO.66
Angels and VCs have backed Facebook,67 Google,68 Tesla Motors,69
and many other notable tech company successes of the last few decades.
These companies now employ hundreds of thousands of individuals and
contribute substantially to our economy.70 This Article argues that, for
sheets . . . inside out.” FREEDMAN & NUTTING, supra note 37, at 115 (citing Paul Graham,
How to be an Angel Investor, PAULGRAHAM.COM (Mar. 2009), http://www.paulgraham.com
/angelinvesting.html [https://perma.cc/QX9G-P6VB]).
64. See Ibrahim, supra note 61, at 1439 n.174 (“[S]yndication means that each start-up will
have an active angel and several passive ones; those passive angels may be the active angels in
other ventures.”).
65. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 584 (“AngelList [a Title II website] has a function called
‘syndicate,’ which operates in exactly the same way as a traditional angel syndicate, except
online. New investors are passive and turn over decision-making to an active angel.”(citing
Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-16/angellist-the-social-network-for-startups
[https://perma.cc/2QM5-GYKF]).
66. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 748–53 (exploring the signaling function of angel
financing); id. at 749 (“VCs send positive signals about the start-ups they fund . . . . [both] to
labor markets and later investors, including investment banks and public investors.” (citing
Antonio Davila, George Foster & Mahendra Gupta, Venture-Capital Financing and the
Growth of Startup Firms 16 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu
/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.201.2971&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/R97P-ZMT7
(staff-uploaded archive)]).
67. Tomio Geron, The Untold Story of Two Early Facebook Investors, FORBES (Feb. 1,
2012, 4:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/02/01/the-untold-story-of-twoearly-facebook-investors/#27bf7042f259 [https://perma.cc/AVA5-VAJV] (discussing Venky
Harinarayan and Anand Rajaraman, two early angel investors in Facebook who did not
receive much media attention).
68. Ibrahim, supra note 61, at 1410 (noting “the funding of Google in 1999 by leading
Silicon Valley firms Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital” (citing Google Milestones,
GOOGLE, http://web.archive.org/web/20080102101316/http://www.google.com/corporate/history
.html [https://perma.cc/2AFN-GEF9]).
69. Press Release, Tesla Motors Secures $40 Million Investment Round Led by
VantagePoint Venture Partners and Elon Musk, BUS. WIRE (May 31, 2006, 7:19 PM), http://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060531006128/en/Tesla-Motors-Secures-40-MillionInvestment-Led [https://perma.cc/M954-DGGT].
70. Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S.
Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J., 2011, no. 2, at 128, 137 (2011) (“To give a sense for
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Title III crowdfunding to work for unsophisticated investors and the
startups that seek their funds, the system must be more expert based,
despite its moniker implying use of the crowd.71
III. CURATION AND EXPERT OPINION IN CROWDFUNDING
Having argued that expert curation is optimal in startup investing,
this Part examines how such curation can and should work in
crowdfunding. This Part first explores funding portals, the natural
reputational intermediary for sorting among the promising and
unpromising startups seeking to list on their websites. Second, for those
startups that a funding portal does list, this Part explores the role that
expert investors can play to further guide unsophisticated investors
toward the most promising of the choices.
A. Funding Portals
Regulation Crowdfunding in its original form as envisioned by the
JOBS Act sought to implement a true “wisdom of the crowds” regime,
where funding portals played an almost completely passive role.72 I have
previously argued that funding portals should be allowed to do more
screening of startups to offer investors better (and fewer) choices.73
Regulation Crowdfunding in its final form implemented some of these

the long-lasting impact of the venture ecosystem on the American economy, as of 2008, eight
out of ten people employed in the software development industry worked for a company with
venture capital roots; seven out of ten people employed in the telecommunications and
semiconductor industries worked for a company with venture capital roots; and more than
half of the people employed in the networking and equipment and
electronics/instrumentation industries worked for a company with venture capital roots.”
(citations omitted)).
71. In his new book on investor protection, Donald Langevoort quotes an experienced
angel investor as “stress[ing] that crowd-based investing ignores nearly every lesson he
learned about how to succeed.” DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK:
CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 130
(2016) (citing Daniel Isenberg, The Road to Crowdfunding Hell, HARVARD BUS. REV. (April
23, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/the-road-to-crowdfunding-hell [https://perma.cc/K99TEFXH]).
72. Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304, 126 Stat. 306, 321–
22 (2012) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.); Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 603–04
(“[U]nder Title III as currently written, a funding portal must basically act as a ‘neutral third
party[.]’ ” (citing Jacques F. Baritot, Note, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding Investors
Under the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 277 (2013)).
73. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 603–06.
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improvements.74 In particular, funding portals may screen startups using
some subjective, “is it a promising company?” criteria.75
The funding portal, as an intermediary, “is the vital link between
the issuer and her investors.”76 And indeed under Regulation
Crowdfunding, it is the only link, as startups must channel all fundraising
activities through one funding portal.77 Funding portals were originally
conceived of as a relationship between portal and investor, not portal
and startup.78 As written in the JOBS Act, a funding portal’s only task
with respect to startups was to do background checks on its principals.79
But changes between the original passage of Title III in the 2012
JOBS Act and the actual implementation of Title III in 2015 now allow
funding portals to do more screening of startups.80 In other words, some
curation on substantive grounds is now allowed. The final rules specify
that “the ability of a funding portal to determine which issuers may use
its platform is important for the protection of investors, as well as to the
viability of the funding portal industry, and thus the crowdfunding
market.”81 Without this change, funding portals would have to “post all
investment opportunities that meet objective criteria [which
would] . . . . eliminate any advantage that [funding portals] have in
knowing how to select businesses to feature on their sites.”82 The final
74. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306,
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.301(c) (2016).
76. Gregory D. Deschler, Comment, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the
Proposed Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUIS U .L.J. 1145,
1167 (2014); see Freedman & Nutting, supra note 12 (“[F]unding portals and broker-dealer
platforms lie at the heart of the equity crowdfunding experience.”).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (requiring issuers offering or selling securities under
Regulation Crowdfunding to conduct its “transaction . . . through an intermediary that
complies with the requirements in [Regulation Crowdfunding and] is conducted exclusively
through the intermediary’s platform”); Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-9974,
34-76324, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,395 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227,
232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274) (“[The SEC] believe[s] that requiring an issuer to use only one
intermediary to conduct an offering or concurrent offerings in reliance on [Regulation
Crowdfunding will] help foster the creation of a ‘crowd’ and better accomplish the purpose of
the statute.”).
78. See Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 602–03.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (2012).
80. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306,
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
81. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,462.
82. Scott Shane, Why Kickstarter and Indiegogo Won’t Go Into Equity Crowdfunding,
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250355 [https://perma
.cc/VL8E-B4CG]; see Jacques F. Baritot, Note, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding
Investors Under the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 277 (2013) (“Intermediaries
could . . . perform their own due diligence by focusing on the merit of technology or services

95 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2017)

1498

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

rules also allow funding portals to have some “skin in the game” by
receiving equity in listed startups as compensation on the same terms as
offered to investors83—usually a trigger for broker-dealer fears.84
Funding portals may also advise the issuer on offerings and offering
documentation.85
These changes are important for allowing a funding portal to use its
expertise to screen startups based on their chances for success, not just
on whether or not the startups are businesses free from fraud. As one
commentator noted, “[t]he most important change [in the new rules] is
probably the SEC’s decision to permit funding portals . . . to selectively
curate which issuers may list on their sites.”86 The commentator further
contended that “[f]ailing to permit funding portals to take on this
important investor protection function could have spelled disaster for
the nascent crowdfunding industry.”87 The signal of having a funding
portal stake its reputation, in part, on the startups it allows to list is an
important step in the right direction.88 I previously observed that
FundersClub, an online offering site for accredited investors under Title
II of the JOBS Act, seemed to be successful due to the site’s prelisting
curation.89 In fact, at the time I wrote that article, each of the startups
listed on FundersClub was a graduate from the prestigious Y
Combinator or 500 Startups.90
Funding portals should also have the incentive to curate, as a
competitive reputation market among funding portals should quickly
offered.” (citing Letter from T.W. Kennedy, funder, Regulated Funding Portal Industry
Ass’n, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 18, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii
/jobstitleiii-133.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB3X-BSFN]).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(b).
84. But see FundersClub Inc. & FundersClub Mgmt. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013
WL 1229456, at *9 (Mar. 26, 2013).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(5).
86. Evan Engstrom, The Good and the Bad in the SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules,
ENGINE (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.engine.is/news/issues/the-good-and-the-bad-in-the-secsnew-crowdfunding-rules/6124 [https://perma.cc/XZ2K-3NG9].
87. Id.
88. Ethan Mollick, Swept Away by the Crowd? Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and the
Selection of Entrepreneurs 21–26 (Mar. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2239204 [https://perma.cc/Z83H-3W47 (staff-uploaded archive)].
89. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 583 (discussing the FundersClub case, which at the time
written allowed only startups graduating from the prestigious Y Combinator accelerator to list
on its site); How FundersClub Selects Companies, FUNDERSCLUB, http://web.archive.org/web
/20150320203530/https://fundersclub.com/vetting [https://perma.cc/JXQ6-EFQY].
90. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 583; Portfolio, FUNDERSCLUB, http://web.archive.org/web
/20150315093040/https://fundersclub.com/portfolio/#fc [https://perma.cc/THG9-6WAE];
Matthew Zeitlin, FundersClub Takes Crowdsourcing Approach to Early-stage Venture
Capital, DailyBeast (Mar 3, 2013, 5:45 AM), [https://perma.cc/X4UP-ZLX2].

95 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2017)

2017]

CROWDFUNDING

1499

form. If the startups listed on a funding portal’s site do well, this may
cause other startups to list there in search of viable opportunities.
Conversely, a funding portal that lists startups that do not meet their
funding goals or often fail will suffer reputational harm that will be bad
for business. WeFunder appears to be out to an early lead, hosting half
of the first fifty Title III offerings.91
B.

Expert Investors

I applaud these changes to the funding portal’s role and think they
give crowdfunding a better chance to succeed. However, this Article’s
goal is to suggest further steps to improve crowdfunding’s long-term
viability.
First, as a practical concern, despite the permitted curation, a
funding portal is still limited in signaling its opinion about a startup’s
merits to unsophisticated investors unless it registers as a broker-dealer,
an expensive step.92 Financially, it seems unlikely that funding portals
that are not already broker-dealers will register as such.93 For example,
after curating who may list with them, a funding portal may “highlight
offerings” on its website, but only based on “objective criteria . . . where
the criteria are reasonably designed to highlight a broader selection of
issuers[.]”94
Accordingly, this Article suggests that more curation is necessary to
allow unsophisticated investors to make better investment decisions
among the startups that make it past a funding portal’s initial litmus test
for listing. This Article proposes to allow expert investors to signal
91. Marc. A. Leaf, Robert T. Esposito & Abigail Luhn, Leading the Crowd: An Analysis
of the First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP (July 14, 2016),
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publications/2016/following-the-crowd-an-analysis-of
-the-first-50-crowdfunding-offerings?Section=Publications [https://perma.cc/VZG2-H7ZG].
92. See Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(a)(1), 126 Stat.
306, 321–22 (2012) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.); David A. Lipton, A Primer on
Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 907–08 (1987) (“Once registered, a
broker-dealer is required to comply with specific record keeping, financial compliance, and
financial reporting requirements . . . . Registered broker-dealers . . . are subject to rigorous net
worth and capital requirements . . . . Further protection is provided investors by the Securities
Investor Protection Act, which requires all registered brokers to join an insurance program to
cover customer losses in instances of brokerage house failure.” (citations omitted))
93. Raxit Shah, Note, Staying the Course with Broker-Dealer Registration: The SEC’s
Impending Regulation of Crowdfunding Portals Under the JOBS Act, 40 J. CORP. L. 275, 281
(2014) (“Registering as a broker-dealer is prohibitively expensive . . . . Recognizing [this] . . . ,
the JOBS Act created an exception to broker-dealer registration for crowdfunding portals.”
(citing Douglas S. Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding Credible, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 19,
20 (2013); Lipton, supra note 92, at 907–08).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(2) (2016).
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relative quality about startups that pass the funding portal’s curation.
There are various ways to effectuate this suggestion. This Part will focus
on increasing the usage of message boards and investment clubs, both
current options on funding portal sites.95
1. Message Boards
Regarding message boards generally, Professor Andrew Schwartz
observes that “[u]sing online chatrooms, bulletin boards and the like,
potential investors and others can directly communicate with one
another and share material information about various crowdfunding
investments.”96 He also correctly observes the monetary impetus for
investors to share information: each individual investor is limited in how
much they can invest, so it will take others investing as well for the
startup to reach its fundraising goal.97 Indeed, a study in the Journal of
Finance found that Internet stock message boards for public companies
can contain “financially relevant information[.]”98
The final rules require funding portals’ websites to include avenues
for investors to communicate with startups and with each other.99
Funding portals can create message boards without fear of this action
making them broker-dealers.100 The final rules notice states that
“communication channels on the intermediary’s platform will provide a
centralized and transparent means for members of the public that have
opened an account with the intermediary to share their views about
investment opportunities[.]”101 The startup’s representatives may also
communicate with investors through message boards so long as they
95. See Werner Antweiler & Murray Z. Frank, Is All That Talk Just Noise? The
Information Content of Internet Stock Message Boards, 59 J. FIN. 1259, 1259, 1292 (2004)
(finding that posting on stock message boards influences trading). Langevoort and Thompson
worry that such communication may undermine crowd-based wisdom by “introducing the risk
of anchoring crowdmembers’ beliefs and undermining the average effect of many
independent beliefs.” Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 27, at 1606–07 (citing Richard P.
Larrick, Albert E. Mannes & Jack B. Soll, The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of Crowds, in
SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227, 232–33 (Joachim I. Krueger ed., 2012). As
I prefer following the expert, I am not overly concerned with the risk Thompson and
Langevoort raise.
96. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 663 (citing DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING 12–
13 (2013)).
97. Id. at 666–67.
98. Antweiler & Frank, supra note 95, at 1292 (“The evidence clearly rejects the
hypothesis that all talk is just noise. There is financially relevant information present.”).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(4).
100. See id. § 227.402(b).
101. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-9974, 34-76324, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387,
71,446 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274).
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identify themselves as startup representatives.102 As with Amazon or
Yelp, the final rules specifically envision some method of quantifying the
ratings to guide other investors.103 One challenge will be to develop
methods of policing self-interested reviews as Amazon and others have
done.104
Does such a system create cause for concern over an investor saying
overly optimistic things on a startup’s message board to entice others to
invest as well? Possibly. However, promoting a startup that does not
warrant it will not be a successful technique in crowdfunding,105 as resale
restrictions and other liquidity issues prevent making a quick buck this
way.106 Because there is no resale market for these investments, the
investor will bear the brunt of a bad investment regardless of whether he
102. 17 C.F.R. § 227.204(c) (“[A]n issuer, and persons acting on behalf of the issuer, may
communicate with investors and potential investors about the terms of the offering through
communication channels provided by the intermediary on the intermediary’s platform,
provided that an issuer identifies itself as the issuer in all communications.”); Crowdfunding,
80 Fed. Reg. at 71,425. See generally Deschler, supra note 76 (supporting a requirement that
issuers identify themselves when posting on funding portal message boards).
103. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,465 (“[A] communication channel may permit
investors to rate or comment on an issuer or offering, or to assign quantifiable indicators to
one other’s comments.”).
104. For example, Amazon reviews can be filtered to include only those that have received
a “verified purchase” badge, meaning the reviewer actually bought the product at or near
market price. Chris Morran, Is Amazon Doing Anything to Fight Latest Wave of Fake, PaidFor Reviews?, CONSUMERIST (Feb. 8, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/02/08/isamazon-doing-anything-to-fight-latest-wave-of-fake-compensated-reviews/ [https://perma.cc
/M5QB-RUMX].
105. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 711, 716–17 (2005) (summarizing pump-and-dump schemes in public company stock).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501(a). Crowdfunding securities are subject to resale restrictions for
one year. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501(a). In addition, even after the year-long sales prohibition has
ended, there are issues regarding the avenues available through which a party can sell these
platforms. Although there are “[s]econdary private investment markets such as
SecondMarket and Shares Post [which] allow shares in pre-IPO private companies to be sold
by employees and investors,” James Johnson, Rule 144 Privately Offered and Restricted
Securities, CROWDEXPERT.COM, http://crowdexpert.com/investment-crowdfunding/rule-144
-privately-offered-restricted-securities/ [https://perma.cc/9HY3-D7PH], it is unclear whether
these secondary private investment markets will allow crowdfunded securities to resell in
these markets or whether these secondary private investment markets are even appropriate
for reselling crowdfunded securities, see Scott Shane, Will Equity Crowdfunding Buyers Be
Able to Sell Their Shares?, ENTREPRENEUR (June 30, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com
/article/247832 [https://perma.cc/QR99-9V99] (arguing that SecondMarket and SharesPost
are inappropriate “for non-accredited investors’ equity-crowdfunding holdings
[because] . . . . [t]hese market makers generally require the approval of the companies that
issued the shares before the stock can change hands, making them a better fit for the
transferring shares of employees than those of investors [and because] . . . . [t]he markets
themselves are also labor intensive and would not be economical for the buying and selling
[of] small numbers of shares”).
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encourages others to join; either the company succeeds and he will make
a profit, or it will fail and his investment will not be returned. Further,
there are also potential liability concerns that should keep fraudsters at
bay, which I discuss below.107
2. Investment Clubs
The second potential mechanism for guiding unsophisticated
investors is investment clubs, which have the benefit of being more
expert based than message boards. Over half of the first fifty Regulation
Crowdfunding offerings were conducted on the funding portal
WeFunder.108 While WeFunder claims it does not curate startups for
their merits, WeFunder’s key sorting mechanisms are the various
“investment clubs” it hosts. On WeFunder, “[i]nvestment clubs are
groups of industry experts who can choose to endorse companies. If
your business gets endorsed by a club, it will appear higher in the sorting
algorithms on WeFunder, and be much more likely to be featured on the
home page.”109 As WeFunder advertises, investment clubs allow
investors to follow “the wisdom of the experts.”110
One prominent WeFunder investment club is the “The Order of the
Orange Hand,” a self-described “mafia of Y Combinator alumni.”111
When investors “back the club,” they commit to invest a certain amount
per deal that the club invests in.112 In short, investors are not even
choosing startups at this point, but totally relying on Y Combinator
alumni’s expertise in doing so.
Investment clubs on WeFunder are similar to piggybacking on an
AngelList (another funding portal that operates under Title II)
investment because a prominent angel invested in the company, a
concept AngelList calls “social proof.”113 In short, AngelList works
because all potential investment opportunities are accompanied by a list

107. See infra Section III.B.3.
108. Leaf et al., supra note 91.
109. Why Wefunder?, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/founders [https://perma.cc
/3QmJ-KLTW].
110. Clubs, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/clubs#club-overview [https://perma.cc
/4ERN-K5GC].
111. The Order of the Orange Hand, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/companies
[https://perma.cc/985Y-CGL7].
112. Clubs, supra note 110.
113. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 584 (quoting Why I Deleted my AngelList Account, BRYCE
DOT VC, http://bryce.vc/post/3520840379/why-i-deleted-my-angellist-account [https://perma.cc
/9GM5-JHVZ]).
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of the notable investors participating in the offering.114 Thus, less
knowledgeable investors can “tag on” to LinkedIn founder Reid
Hoffman’s or Yahoo! CEO Marissa Mayer’s picks.115 This is likewise the
formula behind angel groups’ “sidecar” funds, or investment pools in
which a group of non-expert angels co-invest small amounts with expert
angels in larger deals.116 Investment clubs represent another move
toward expert-based investing through Regulation Crowdfunding.117
3. Liability Concerns
There are some potential liability concerns for those experts who
promote particular offerings. One liability concern is whether selfprofessed experts could be liable for fraudulent or failed offerings as
investment advisers118 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
114. Id. (“As one former AngelList investor writes, ‘Nearly every email [AngelList]
send[s] includes names of people or firms who’ve committed to invest.’ ” (alteration in
original) (quoting Why I Deleted my AngelList Account, BRYCE DOT VC, http://bryce.vc/post
/3520840379/why-i-deleted-my-angellist-account [https://perma.cc/9GM5-JHVZ]).
115. See id. (“Top angels, by followers, on AngelList are household names: Reid Hoffman
(founder of LinkedIn), Marissa Mayer (CEO of Yahoo), and the actor Ashton
Kutcher.”(citing Andrew Davidson, Follow the Money: AngelList Has Blown Open EarlyStage Investments, WIRED (May 17, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/follow-the-money
[https://perma.cc/D7QW-LBNG]).
116. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 743 (“Angel group members still invest personal funds,
although some of the larger groups have also established ‘sidecar’ funds to co-invest in the
group’s most attractive deals.” (citing Carol M. Sands, The Angels’ Forum and The Halo
Fund: The Rise of the Professional Angel, in STATE OF THE ART: AN EXECUTIVE BRIEFING
ON CUTTING-EDGE PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ANGEL INVESTING 32, 39 (John May &
Elizabeth F. O'Halloran eds., 2003)).
117. See supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text. Interestingly, many of the initial Title
III offerings are not tech startups, but lifestyle companies selling alcoholic beverages and the
like. See Leaf et al., supra note 91. Does this change my “experts versus crowds” analysis? I
submit that it does not, but would expand my definition of an expert in those cases to be
broader than tech expertise or experience. For example, an “expert” in evaluating a fast
maturing Scotch company could be an expert in Scotch tasting. See Cleveland Whiskey:
Whiskey 2.0/ Disruptive Technology, supra note 25. Although one concern could be that such
experts would be changing on a company-by-company basis, thus negating any kind of a
reputation-based screening approach to tagging along as one would have with Reid Hoffman.
118. Under the Advisers Act, an investment adviser is “any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities[,]” but excludes
(A) a bank, or any bank holding company as defined in the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 . . . which is not an investment company . . . [unless] the bank or bank
holding company serves or acts as an investment advisor to a registered investment
company . . . (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of
such services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (C) any broker or
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(“Advisers Act”).119 If so, experts could be considered investment
advisers under the Act, and thus, subject to the Adviser’s Act duties and
restrictions. Thus, experts could be liable for fraudulent or failed
offerings.120 Possible liability concerns under the Advisers Act include
financial penalties or imprisonment for willfully violating121 the Advisers
Act’s registration122 or reporting requirements;123 duty to “prevent
misuse . . . of material, nonpublic information”;124 and ban on
“fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” “acts, practices, and courses of
business[.]”125
A second liability concern is that Regulation Crowdfunding
offerings are expressly subject to section 12(a)(2) antifraud liability
under the Securities Act of 1933.126 Following the U.S. Supreme Court

dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his
business as a broker dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor; (D)
the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial
publication of general and regular circulation; (E) [government securities advisers];
(F) [credit rating agencies], unless such organization engages in issuing
recommendations as to purchasing, selling, or holding securities or in managing
assets, consisting of in whole or in part of securities, on behalf of others; (G) any
family office . . . (H) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the
Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (2012). The SEC has noted three elements to qualify as an investment
adviser, (1) compensation is “broadly construed” and generally refers to “the receipt of any
economic benefit”; (2) “[g]enerally, a person providing advice about specific securities [is]
‘engaged in the business’ unless specific advice is rendered only on a rare or isolated
occasion”; and (3) a person “clearly” advises others about securities “if he provides advice to
others about specific securities,” although “more difficult questions arise with less specific
advice, or advice that is only indirectly about securities.” DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2–3 (Mar. 2013) (citations omitted), https://www.sec.gov/about
/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QNK-DABK]. Additionally,
the SEC has indicated that an individual or entity does not act as an investment adviser by
merely hosting issuer-provided information on an investment online. See Angel Capital Elec.
Network, 1996 SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094, at *1–2 (Oct. 25, 1996).
119. Mark Roderick, Are Crowdfunding Portals Investment Advisers?, CROWDFUNDING
& FINTECH L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2015), https://crowdfundattny.com/2015/02/09/are-crowdfundingportals-investment-advisers/ [https://perma.cc/BDJ6-7D93] (discussing whether crowdfunding
portals are investment advisers under the Advisers Act).
120. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-17, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6. For the codified version of
the Advisers Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17.
122. Id. § 80b-3.
123. Id. § 80b-4.
124. Id. § 80b-4a.
125. Id. § 80b-6.
126. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012));
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1).
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case of Pinter v. Dahl,127 section 12(a)(2) defendants include (1) those
that pass title to securities, which is in this case the startup, and (2) those
that solicit investors for value, potentially the experts.128 The pertinent
question in crowdfunding is whether experts, by promoting a particular
investment through message boards or investment clubs, rise to the level
of solicitors for value.
According to Professor Steven Bradford, “[u]nfortunately, ‘[t]he
courts have had a great deal of difficulty in defining precisely how much
active participation is required [for a solicitation].’ Several courts have
read Pinter to require that the defendant must urge or persuade the
investor to buy the particular security.”129 Such an interpretation would
be a step closer to liability for experts promoting particular
crowdfunding offerings. Thus, experts should walk a fine line in enticing
others to join them in crowdfunding offerings but not becoming
responsible for the startup’s mistakes. Perhaps an expert can simply
acknowledge they are participating in a particular investment, as
AngelList emails do,130 but not promote it beyond that. More clarity
from the SEC is required to understand the limits of expert opinion in
crowdfunding offerings.
CONCLUSION
The great experiment of crowdfunding is off and running. The law
firm Drinker Biddle recently performed an analysis of the first fifty

127. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
128. Id. at 647 (“The language and purpose of § 12(1) [(now § 12(a)(1))] suggest that
liability extends only to the person who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in
part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner. If he had
such a motivation, it is fair to say that the buyer ‘purchased’ the security from him and to align
him with the owner in a rescission action.”); see C. Steven Bradford, Shooting the Messenger:
The Liability of Crowdfunding Intermediaries for the Fraud of Others, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 371,
392 n.125 (2014). The Supreme Court in Pinter took no position on whether its analysis under
section 12(a)(1) also applies to section 12(a)(2). See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642 n.20. But the lower
courts have held that it does apply. See, e.g., Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628,
635 (3d Cir. 1989); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1989);
Crawford v. Glenns, Inc., 876 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478
(2d Cir. 1988).
129. Bradford, supra note 128, at 393 (second alternation in original) (quoting THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 290 (6th ed. 2009))
(citations omitted).
130. See Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 583–84; Terms of Service, ANGELLIST (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://angel.co/terms [https://perma.cc/27BR-XWAS] (stating that AngelList “do[es] not act
as an investment adviser to any [i]nvestor(s) and no part of [the AngelList website] is
intended to constitute investment advice”).
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crowdfunding offerings.131 It found that issuers sought to raise a median
of only $55,000 per offering, but would take more should there be
additional interest.132 The analysis also found that these were startups
with a median age of just less than a year, so very early stage.133 This fits
with my earlier prediction that potentially promising startups seek
crowdfunding dollars as a substitute for friends and family money.134
These startups are not being rejected by angels or VCs per se—they are
simply too early stage to put to good use the amounts angels and VCs
would invest. Or, perhaps they are not the type of companies that will
attract angels or VCs at all. Still, these startups will now have a better
chance of succeeding in crowdfunding due to the ever-increasing role
that expert opinion will play in this medium.
True crowd-based investing was always a fantasy. A website named
Piqqem tried it. In Piqqem, “before you can see what the crowd thinks
you have to give your own prediction.”135 As its then-CEO explained,
“we differ from other sites in that we are a true wisdom of crowds
sourcing application.”136 Piqqem appears to have failed,137 and with good
reason. Crowds are not well equipped to make wise investments in
startups, but experts are. And these experts can send signals to
unsophisticated investors to allow these investors, too, to participate in
early-stage startup investing—thus potentially fulfilling crowdfunding’s
promise.

131. Leaf et al., supra note 91.
132. Id.
133. Id. (“Early data shows that issuers tend to be early-stage startups, with a median
issuer age of just 354 days. Nevertheless, nine of the issuers were more than five years
old . . . .”).
134. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 589 (stating that startups who crowdfund “might seek only
$20,000 to develop a prototype, hire a lawyer to incorporate, or obtain a patent. Instead of
bootstrapping with credit cards or hitting up the entrepreneur’s parents, these startups might
look to Title III” (footnote omitted)).
135. Erick Schonfeld, Can Piqqem Use the Crowd To Pick Stocks? Don’t Bet On It,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 7, 2008), https://techcrunch.com/2008/11/07/can-piqqem-use-the-crowdto-pick-stocks-dont-bet-on-it/ [https://perma.cc/7AYN-X6EH].
136. Id.
137. Welcome to Our Site, PIQQEM: INVESTING & INVESTMENT TIPS, http://www.piqqem
.com/# [https://perma.cc/CN8D-6KVS]. There is no recent information on the Piqqem
crowdfunding site online—all news articles about the company are at least 6 years old.
Piqqem.com is still an active website, but the company’s provided phone number has been
disconnected. The site most recently appeared to host a blog. Id.

